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Abstract—Cooperative Intelligent Transport Systems (C–ITS)
is an emerging technology that aims at improving road safety,
traffic efficiency and drivers experience. To this end, vehicles
cooperate with each others and the infrastructure by exchanging
Vehicle–to–X communication (V2X) messages. In such commu-
nicating systems message authentication and privacy are of
paramount importance. The commonly adopted solution to cope
with these issues relies on the use of a Public Key Infrastructure
(PKI) that provides digital certificates to entities of the system.
Even if the use of pseudonym certificates mitigate the privacy
issues, the PKI cannot address all cyber threats. That is why
we need a mechanism that enable each entity of the system
to detect and report misbehaving neighbors. In this paper, we
provide a state-of-the-art of misbehavior detection methods. We
then discuss their feasibility with respect to current standards
and law compliance as well as hardware/software requirements.
Index Terms—Misbehavior Detection, Cooperative ITS, Secu-
rity
I. INTRODUCTION
Cooperative Intelligent Transport Systems are based on data
communication over Vehicular Ad hoc NETworks (VANETs).
VANET is an open network where vehicles exchange data
to ensure road safety. Safety messages exchanged over the
VANETs are not encrypted. This would leave the system
open to endless security threats without a PKI system that
guarantees sender authentication and data integrity. However,
misbehaving entities can transmits tampered data or omits data
it should transmit. In this case, PKI based security would not
be able to prevent such data semantic level attacks. Thus, the
safety system highly requires the deployment of additional
security mechanisms which are able to detect, and react to,
misbehaving entities in the network.
In this paper, we assess the feasibility of existing misbehav-
ior detection mechanisms within the current C–ITS ecosystem.
We restrict our scope to the detection techniques targeted at the
sybil attack and the bogus information attack as they are com-
mon and relevant attacks in C–ITS. Indeed, it was deemed that
these types of attacks needed detection mechanisms specific to
the VANETs as opposed to attacks such as DoS, blackhole or
flooding which could inherit detection mechanisms from the
Mobile Ad hoc NETworks (MANETs) or any adhoc networks.
It is also worth noting that the sybil and bogus information
attack are still widely untreated as opposed to other types
of attacks (e.g., replay and the message alteration) which are
addressed by the PKI asymmetric cryptographic mechanisms.
In this work we focus mainly on local detection in the
VANETs. We contribute to the state of the art by providing
a new classification and understanding of recent works on
misbehavior detection in C–ITS. In our opinion, it helps to
deeply analyze the feasibility of such mechanisms in the
current ecosystem and discuss remaining challenges that have
to be addressed by the community.
In the next section we evaluate the detection mechanisms
based on their feasibility. We focus on the logic behind the
detection mechanisms instead of the details of every detection
method. The evaluation does not consider the performance of
the detection algorithm. This is followed by a summary, a brief
discussion and a conclusion.
II. MISBEHAVIOR DETECTION FEASIBILITY CHALLENGES
Feasibility is assessed on multiple levels. Currently, stan-
dardization bodies such as the European Telecommunications
Standards Institute (ETSI) and Institute of Electrical and
Electronics Engineers (IEEE) made significant progress in
designing the C–ITS architecture. We believe that misbehavior
detection mechanisms should be in line with the current
standards to ensure a much needed fast and easy deployment.
Furthermore, misbehavior detection mechanisms face chal-
lenges caused by the constant conflict between security and
privacy. This conflict often appears in the form of regulations
or legal complications (e.g. it violates the General Data
Protection Regulation (GDPR) [1]) . Finally, there is feasibility
challenges in term of the required equipment necessary for
the functionality of a detection mechanism. The equipment
required for a detection mechanism could be too expensive
to include in each node. Additionally, the entire system could
have not yet reached the maturity a mechanism requires.
In the following section we will illustrate standard incomat-
ibilities with a circle (b), legal and regulation conflicts with
a square (u) and required equipment with a triangle (W).
A. Detection of sybil attacks
With the current ETSI and IEEE C–ITS model, the PKI
infrastructure provide the vehicle with multiple valid keys. The
vehicle proceeds to change its identity regularly to prevent
easy remote trackability. The multiple identities a vehicle
uses are called pseudonyms. An attacker could take advantage
of pseudonyms to launch a Sybil attack. It is worth noting
that since Sybil attack is ultimately a special kind of bo-
gus information attack, it could also be detected by some
types of methods designed for bogus information detection.
In particular we note physical-layer and data-centric false
beacon information detection mechanisms. However, from the
multiple studies that have targeted the detection and mitigation
of the sybil attack, we extract three prominent methodologies
used for sybil detection:
a) Path history detection mechanisms: [2], [3] and [4]
propose a model where a vehicle with an On–Board Unit
(OBU) collects signed time stamps from Road–Side Units
(RSUs). The theory is that these stamps act as proof that a
vehicle had passed a certain RSU. Each vehicle is required to
broadcast collected stamps. Since a Sybil attacker can only
have one physical path, a group of vehicle with a similar
collection of stamps is considered a suspect of a sybil attack.
The current state of the standard requires a vehicle to
change all of its identifiers when using a new certificate, in
order to prevent linkability between pseudonyms [5]. However,
beaconing a footprint history would negate this effect and
facilitate the linkability of pseudonyms (b). Additionally, a
new protocol has to be implemented to enable: the RSUs to
issue signed timestamps and the OBUs to beacon these times-
tamps (b). Although the current ETSI Cooperative Awareness
Message (CAM) messages include an optional path history
field, this variable consists of a list of GPS coordinates and
is not compatible with the signed timestamps proposed in this
method [6]. Furthermore, it is unclear if broadcasting a type
of path history is friendly to the current privacy protection
laws (u). And although in [4] and [2] the privacy issue of
direct traceability is addressed, however this would not negate
the pseudonyms linkability problem. And finally, this approach
relies on a wide coverage RSUs in the C–ITS network (W).
b) Pseudonym Linkability based mechanisms: Some
studied rely on a system where in some way pseudonyms have
to be linked. Linking pseudonyms would enable the detection
of a sybil attacker using the certificates issued for the same
vehicle. [7] introduced Privacy-Preserving Detection of Abuses
of Pseudonyms (P2DAP), a method which enables linkability
at RSU level by using pseudonyms which hash a common
value. Similarly, Detection Technique against a Sybil Attack
(DTSA) [8] suggests that each vehicle verifies the identity
of neighboring vehicles with the help of a VANET server,
currently accessible via RSUs.
Enabling pseudonym linking at the RSU level is not com-
pliant with the privacy requirements of C–ITS. Currently, the
PKI system is designed such that not even the Authorization
Authority (AA) and the Enrolment Authority (EA) are able to
link pseudonyms without cooperating [9] (u). At the present
time, the ETSI standard does not specify any linkage authority
and the IEEE designed linkage authority is available only
to the misbehavior authority [10] (b). Moreover, it is not
clear how scalable is this approach when RSU has to link
pseudonyms of a great number of vehicles (W).
c) Neighbor List Exchange: Studies from [11] [12],
propose a protocol that relies on vehicles broadcasting a
list of neighbors. The broadcasted list should include unique
identifiers for neighbors such as the hash of the last beacon.
Calculation then determines the legitimacy of each node
according to the neighbors list and the range of each vehicle.
Sybil attackers could then be reported or excluded from the
network.
Exchanging the neighbor lists is a distributed and simple
approach. However, its efficiency could be greatly affected
by the rate of the pseudonym change [13] (b). Furthermore,
data protection acts could oppose broadcasting the information
about other vehicles (u).
Since Sybil attack is ultimately a special kind of bogus
information attack, it could also be detected by some types
of methods designed for bogus information detection. In
particular we note physical-layer and data-centric false beacon
information detection mechanisms. Which we address in detail
in the following section.
B. Bogus information
Broadcasting bogus information on a C–ITS network could
have a range of results varying from minor like deteriorating
the quality of infotainment services to dramatic like causing
accidents and potentially victims. Specific methods of detec-
tion have been proposed in the literature. We organize our eval-
uation into three sections: Detection methods for false position
information (the main component of the beacon message),
Detection methods for warning messages, Detection methods
that evaluate a node and thus all messages it broadcasts.
1) False beacon information:
a) Physical Layer detection: Multiple studies suggest
location verification using physical aspects of the signal. [14]
propose a method of triangulation of a node using distributed
sensors on the network, this could currently be considered
RSUs. [15] and [16] propose the use of distance-bounding
in vehicular networks. This method relies on the speed of
light and the message timestamp to verify the distance from
the source of the signal. Additionally, [12] uses the Received
Signal Strength (RSS) in its location verification process.
Physical detection methods are generally compatible with
the standard and the corresponding laws. However, they may
require a total RSU coverage and special detection equipments
(W).
b) Data-centric detection: This mechanism uses the se-
mantics of the messages to determine the authenticity. VEhicle
Behavior Analysis and Evaluation Scheme (VEBAS) [17]
propose the use of multiple data-centric mechanisms such
as: Acceptance Range Threshold (ART), Minimum Distance
Moved (MDM), Map-Proofed Position (MPP) and Sudden Ap-
pearance Warning (SAW).The multiple methods are combined
using Exponentially Weighted Moving Average (EWMA). [18]
proposes a method that combines mechanism from VEBAS
and a plausibility model to check intersection of multiple
vehicles. [19] improves on the ART by creating enhanced
Acceptance Range Threshold (eART) where the acceptance
range is similar to a gaussian curve instead of a fixed threshold.
The gaussian approach is better for combining eART with
other mechanisms.
Generally local data-centric mechanisms don’t present ma-
jor feasibility issues. The presented mechanisms do not require
any changes to the standard nor present legal challenges.
However, according to the proposed method, they may require
significant on board processing power (W).
c) Additional Information Exchange: Several of the stud-
ied proposed for local misbehavior detection use a mechanism
that requires the exchange of additional information between
neighboring vehicles. [20] combines the data-centric methods
used in [17] and the proactive exchange of neighbor tables.
[19] combines the eART and the proactive neighbor exchange
using subjective logic [21]. [22] proposes a method that relies
on statistical model where vehicles calculate and broadcast a
flow parameter. The flow parameter is calculated based on the
density and speed of vehicles in a fixed range and thus the flow
for neighboring vehicles has to be within a certain threshold.
For this mechanism to work, a new protocol for exchanging
additional information between neighbors has to be standard-
ized and implemented [6] (b). Additionally, the legality of
sharing certain additional data between neighbors has to be
investigated (u).
2) False warning messages:
a) Data-centric detection: [23] and [16] rely on the
assumption that a vehicle emitting a warning event should
behave accordingly. For example, a vehicle issuing a blocked
road warning needs to be on a proximity of the event and
needs to change its path accordingly to avoid the obstacle. A
vehicle issuing a warning event is thus monitored by receiving
vehicles to determine the message authenticity.
A block of the pseudonym change after generating a warn-
ing message is currently planned to be included in the standard
[24]. Thus this method is compatible with the standard,
presents no legal challenges, and does not require any special
equipment. However, it is worth noting that this approach
assumes that the malicious vehicle is only deceptive about
the warning messages. Otherwise beacons its correct location
information. Therefore, this method has to be bundled with a
position verification technique.
b) Voting-based detection: Some studies have proposed
voting or cooperative validation of an event to insure integrity.
This mechanism proved effective in a densely populated net-
work with an honest majority. [25] proposes the validation of
an event based on signatures, the signatures are collected and
distributed using growth code. [26] proposes a method with a
Certainty of Event (CoE) curve. The CoE is calculated using
a combination of mechanisms, one of which is the reports
from other vehicles. [27] considers a system where an event
becomes valid if the number of witnesses exceeds a certain
threshold, then proceeds to evaluate multiple threshold-based
event validation algorithms.
Similarly to other mechanisms, voting schemes requires a
new protocol and messages architecture [6] [28] (b). Never-
theless, this protocol could be more challenging to integrate
due to the effect of pseudonymity on voting integrity (b). This
effect is amplified with a high frequency of pseudonym change
[13].
3) Node trust evaluation: In this section we evaluate de-
tection methods that instead of estimating the correctness of
messages separately, estimate trust in the vehicle. Therefore
all messages from a corresponding node will be evaluated
according to its trust level.
It is worth noting that all methods that evaluate node trust
are eventually affected by pseudonym change. This issue could
be more or less severe depending on the change frequency of
the pseudonyms. (b)
a) Reputation-based methods: Reputation is the trust
built by in a vehicle over time. The CoE [26] is calculated
by combining from multiple sources one of which is a sender
reputation mechanism to evaluate the integrity of an event. A
vehicle’s trust increases if it reports a true alert and decreases
otherwise. It is worth noting that although the combination of
different mechanisms increases the efficiency of the method,
however it inherits all the feasibility challenges.
Reputation mechanisms are inherently incompatible with
pseudonymity, therefore on conflict with privacy protection
(u)(b). Furthermore, the protocol for the reputation system
has to be put in place and added to the standard [6] [28](b).
b) Cooperative trust establishment: The two main meth-
ods to cooperative trust are voting and consensus mechanisms.
Multiple voting mechanisms exists such as Local Eviction of
Attackers by Voting Evaluators (LEAVE) [29], Suicide-based
Local Eviction Protocol (SLEP) and Permanent Revocation
Protocol (PRP) [30]. Consensus mechanisms have also been
studied. [31] proposes a method that builds trust using data-
centric mechanisms (like the MDM) then broadcast the results
for neighbors to incorporate in their total trust. [32] introduce
a novel Trust architecture for Vehicular Networks using the
standardized messaging services of ETSI ITS (T-VNets), a
method that proposes a building trust on using a combination
of different mechanisms: data-centric, event-based, watchdog,
RSU-based trust. The trust level is shared between nodes using
CAMs and regularly updated.
Similarly to all node-centric approaches, compatibility with
pseudonyms is always a challenge (b). Additionally, coopera-
tive trust establishment requires the modification of the current
communications architecture whether to include voting or for
consensus mechanisms [6] [28] (b). And last, revocation of a
node from the network entails a denial of security application
to the node. Legally it is unclear if nodes of the same clearance
level could deny other nodes from accessing the network (u).
c) Data-centric trust evaluation: Data-centric methods
evaluate trust without using cooperation between vehicles.
This approach would reduce the risk of a sybil attack. [33]
proposes a method that evaluate trust based on: the type of
TABLE I
SUMMARY OF THE FEASIBILITY CHALLENGES.
4: COMPATIBLE, :: REQUIRES ADJUSMENT/STUDY, 6: INCOMPATIBLE
Detection Method
Current feasibility
Standard
b
Legal
u
Equipment
W
Sybil
Path History [2] [3] [4] 6 6 :
RSU linkability [7] [8] : : :
Neighbor List [11] [12] : : 4
Sybil &
Bogus
Info
Beacon Messages
RSU triangulation [14] 4 4 :
Signal Properties [12] [15] [16] 4 4 4
Data-Centric [17] [18] [19] 4 4 :
Info Exchange [19] [20] [22] : : 4
Bogus
Info
Warning Messages
Data-Centric [23] [16] 4 4 4
Voting-Based [25] [26] [27] : 4 4
Node-Trust
Reputation-Based [26] 6 6 4
Cooperative [29] [30] [31] [32] 6 : 4
Data-Centric [33] 6 4 4
Pseudonym Linking [34] [35] 4 6 4
the vehicle (police vehicle, emergency vehicle, ...), the event-
specific trustworthiness (trust based on the relation of the event
to the emitting vehicle), the dynamic trustworthiness (based on
the revocation status) and the time and location indicators such
as the proximity to the event.
Data-centric methods are generally compatible with the
laws and the standard. However, the node-centric approach
also adopted by these methods may have a conflict with the
pseudonymity ensured in the standard (b).
d) Pseudonym linking: In order to circumvent the issue
of pseudonymity for the trust establishing mechanisms, some
methods propose solution to achieve an implicit linkability
between pseudonyms. The main idea is to analyze the beacon
messages to estimate the trajectory of a vehicle. [34] proposes
a method that uses Kalman filters for trajectory prediction and
vehicle tracking. Therefore implicitly linking the pseudonyms.
[35] Discuss the opportunities of wireless fingerprinting for
node identification. The result of the simulations claims a
high success rate in the detection of sybil attacks. Both
those methods could be used with any node-based detector
to increase the integrity of honest nodes.
Although the implicit linking of pseudonyms benefits
greatly all node-based mechanisms, privacy protection regu-
lations may oppose to these types of methods to ensure that
linkability is only feasible by a trusted authority. Otherwise,
the whole concept of pseudonyms may as well be questioned
(u).
III. DISCUSSION
Table ?? summarizes the feasibility evaluation of Section II.
The first observation is that mechanisms designed to detect
false beacon messages or warning messages separately, are
globally feasible. Interestingly, these methods could be com-
bined to form a global misbehavior detection framework. On
the other hand, mechanisms based on node-trust face more
feasibility challenges. However, the feasibility is not the only
factor to consider. The performance of a mechanism should
also be evaluated [36]. Some problems could be overcome if
there is a big enough incentive. A system that requires changes
in the regulations, in existing standards, or requires specific
equipment should justify a clear major benefit to have a chance
to be adopted.
A system with incompatibilities with the standard could be
considered if the advantages it presents are significant. For
example, several solutions [11], [12], [18]–[20] are based on a
neighbor’s information sharing mechanism. In simulation, this
mechanism shows promising results [19] and does not imply
major changes in standardized protocols to add the relevant
fields on exchanged messages. For these reasons, we classify
this methods among those that have a good balance between
”costs” and benefits. On the other hand, reputation-based
mechanisms that requires the C–ITS to have a stable identity,
are harder to integrate. Requiring a stable vehicle identity
would directly oppose the pseudonymity both practically and
in principle. Therefore, the addition of a reputation protocol
requires rethinking major parts of the current system and is
unlikely to be adopted.
Systems that present legal issues are difficult to adopt,
because they need a change in the regulations. Legal issues
(usually privacy violations) itself can prevent system deploy-
ment despite the advantages it presents. For instance, detection
methods that rely on broadcasting a path history present major
legal concerns related to privacy. Similarly, methods that are
based on the implicit local linkability of pseudonym explicitly
oppose the mechanisms put in place for privacy protection. In
our humble opinion, in practice privacy threatening methods
such as those that rely on path history broadcasting and local
pseudonym linking are unlikely to be deployed, especially in
the presence of alternative methods more privacy friendly.
Lastly, methods that require specific equipment face the
simple trade off of cost and benefits. For a method to be
eligible for deployment, in some way the benefits have to
outweigh the costs. With this in mind, we take the example
of the RSU triangulation technique for location verification.
Currently, RSU coverage is limited and thus the cost of a total
RSU coverage is high compared to the benefits. Moreover,
other less demanding methods exist. However, in a later stage
of the connected C–ITS network, with a wider and more secure
RSU coverage, the triangulation check could be easier to be
justified and subsequently integrated.
In essence, this study aims not to evaluate the detection
methods based on their current compatibility status. Instead,
the goal is to evaluate the compatibility status itself. The C–
ITS systems are reaching the deployment stages. A misbehav-
ior detection system, based on the current state of the art needs
to be implemented and deployed in parallel with the deploy-
ment of C–ITS systems. The need for a robust and seamlessly
compatible detection method is imminent. Moving forward,
the gap between the regulations and the scientific methods
needs to be bridged. The regulations need to be adapted to
accommodate for some detection mechanisms. Correspond-
ingly, studies need to consider the feasibility challenges while
innovating new misbehavior detection mechanisms.
IV. CONCLUSION
In this paper we present an overview on the misbehavior
detection techniques common to multiple studies. We reflect
on the feasibility of the presented techniques. We discuss
our point of view on which propositions are eligible for a
real deployment and which requires major revisions. We also
conclude that more research should target the legal aspect of
the security mechanisms present in the literature. This work
will be useful to the community to have an understanding
of the state of the art with respect to technical, legal and
standardization constraints.
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